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Abstract 
 
This article breaks new ground by reframing the context in which the governments of 
India and the Soviet Union arrived at an understanding that determined the course of 
cinematic exchange between the two countries during the Cold War. It suggests that 
official Indian attitudes to the export of commercial films to the Union of Soviet 
Socialist Republics were not formulated on the basis of carefully calibrated political 
considerations, but rather on an ad hoc footing, and in response to a combination of 
unwelcome Soviet pressure and commercial concerns voiced by Indian filmmakers. 
To fully understand the origins of Indian cinema’s emergence as an prominent feature 
of cultural life behind the Iron Curtain it is necessary to travel back to the early 1950s, 
when an unlikely alliance was forged between K. A. Abbas, a flamboyant and 
politically well-connected Indian filmmaker, and N. P. Koulebiakin, a dour 
communist apparatchik in charge of the Indian arm of Sovexportfilm, the Soviet 
agency responsible for the import and export of feature films. Specifically, this article 
recovers the hitherto elided role played by Indian filmmakers, such as Abbas, and 
lesser known Indian films, such as Rahi, in establishing the political ground rules that 
governed bi-lateral Indo-Soviet cinematic interchange. 
 
 
On 26 June 1954, Khwaja Ahmad Abbas, an influential Indian film producer, director 
and screenwriter, dispatched a stinging letter to C. B. Rao, deputy secretary of India’s 
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ministry of Information and Broadcasting (I&B). Writing from Mumbai, where his 
production company, Naya Sansar (New World), had developed cinematic 
blockbusters such as Awara (Tramp), Abbas lamented efforts to export his latest film, 
Rahi (Wayfarer), to the Soviet Union, had turned into ‘a ‘rather tedious and 
unfortunate affair.’ 1  The crux of Abbas’ disaffection centred on the Indian 
government’s interaction with N. P. Koulebiakin, a Soviet citizen who had arrived in 
the subcontinent the previous year. An Indologist and professor of Sanskrit, 
Koulebiakin had come to South Asia to manage the Indian branch of Sovexportfilm, 
the official Soviet agency dealing with the import and export of feature films. During 
the proceeding eighteen months, Koulebiakin’s efforts to enlist the support of the 
Government of India in procuring Indian films for Soviet audiences had met with a 
series of setbacks, frustrations and misunderstandings.  
To Abbas’ alarm, protracted negotiations between Indian government officials and 
Koulebiakin over the export of Rahi had taken an increasingly acrimonious turn that 
threatened both wider Indo-Soviet relations, and the film producer’s access to 
lucrative export revenues. The Indian filmmaker reflected ruefully that since entering 
into discussions with Koulebiakin in an effort to bring his work to cinemagoers inside 
the communist bloc, ‘much water has flown down the Volga as well as the Jumna, but 
my dilemma and puzzlement remain very much the same.’ ‘So far as I can see,’ 
Abbas complained bitterly to the ministry of Information and Broadcasting, ‘the 
Soviet Government is not going to displease the Government of India for the sake of a 
single film (which happens to be my film) but I am afraid the whole affair is going to 
leave a bad taste in their mouth, and their whole scheme of buying Indian films may 
be jettisoned.’ Concluding his missive to C. B. Rao with a dramatic flourish of artistic 
pique, the Indian film impresario cautioned that, ‘Your Ministry’s ban on RAHI’s 
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sojourn to Russia will only deliver the coup de grace to the reckless idealism of 
producers.’2 
The genesis of Indian cinematic exchange with the Soviet Union during the Cold 
War period has received scant scholarly attention. Accounts of the history of India 
cinema have been framed overwhelmingly in a narrow domestic context, privileging 
Indian filmmaking’s social and cultural impact inside the subcontinent. Broader 
studies of the transnational dimension of popular Indian film have invariably been 
interpreted through the prism of diasporic South Asian communities located in Europe 
and the United States. Works such as Eric Barnouw’s and S. Krishnaswamy’s, Indian 
Film (1980), engage with the evolution of Indian cinema as form of cultural 
production and as an arbiter of shifting social norms, but largely ignore its wider 
international significance. Similarly, Sumita Chakravarty’s valuable intervention, 
National Ideology in Indian Popular Cinema, 1947-1987 (1983), approaches post-
1947 Indian cinematography primarily as means of assessing the construction of post-
colonial Indian national identities. Likewise, Dinesh Raheja’s and Jitendra Kothari’s, 
Indian Cinema: The Bollywood Saga (2004), while providing a comprehensive 
narrative of the growth of Indian film during the twentieth-century, marginalizes its 
global influence outside the Western Hemisphere. Prominent surveys, such as 
Bollywood: The Indian Cinema Story (2001), by Nasreen Munir Kabir, offer little 
insight into the geo-politics of Indian cinema. K. A. Abbas’ own, I am Not an Island: 
An Experiment in Autobiography (1977), is full of illuminating, if self-congratulatory 
vignettes, that laud the author’s role in bringing Indian cinema to the Soviet Union, 
but omits any discussion of the Cold War politics underpinning early Indo-Soviet 
cultural diplomacy.3 
A notable exception to the dearth of critical analysis informing current 
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understanding of Indo-Soviet cinematic interchange is Sudha Rajagoplan’s recent 
publication, Indian Films in Soviet Cinemas: The Culture of Movie-Going After Stalin 
(2008). 4  Rajagopalan provides a sweeping examination of Soviet cultural 
consumption of India cinema, from the so-called ‘golden age’ of Hindi films in the 
1950s, through to the implosion of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in the 
early 1990s. Yet, Rajagopalan’s book overlooks the critical role played by 
filmmakers, such as Abbas, and less celebrated films, such as Rahi, in establishing the 
political ground rules that governed bi-lateral Indo-Soviet cinematic transactions. 
Moreover, Rajagoplan’s attention is directed predominantly upon the reception of 
Indian movies in the Soviet Union, and has little to say on the Cold War politics that 
determined the Indian government’s relationships with Bollywood filmmakers 
attracted by commercial opportunities behind the iron Curtain. Important work has 
been conducted, therefore, into the broad history of Indian cinema’s relationship with 
the Soviet Union. However, the political mechanisms established to facilitate early 
cinematic collaboration between India and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 
and, more pertinently, the currency that these retained throughout the remainder of the 
Cold War, remains a historiographical lacuna in need of attention. 
This article breaks new ground by reframing the context in which the governments 
of India and the Soviet Union arrived at an understanding that determined the course 
of cinematic exchange between the two countries during the Cold War. It suggests 
that official Indian attitudes to the export of commercial films to the Union of Soviet 
Socialist Republics were not formulated on the basis of carefully calibrated political 
considerations, but rather on an ad hoc footing, and in response to a combination of 
unwelcome Soviet pressure and commercial concerns voiced by Indian filmmakers. 
To fully understand the origins of Indian cinema’s emergence as an prominent feature 
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of cultural life in the Soviet Union, it is necessary to travel back to the early 1950s 
and interrogate an unlikely alliance forged between K. A. Abbas, a flamboyant and 
politically connected Indian filmmaker, and N. P. Koulebiakin, the dour communist 
apparatchik in charge of the Indian arm of Sovexportfilm.  
In July 1953, shortly after arriving in Mumbai from Moscow to take charge of 
Sovexportfilm’s Indian office, Koulebiakin earmarked Abbas’ film, Rahi, as suitable 
for public exhibition in the Soviet Union. Based on Mulk Raj Anand’s novel, Two 
Leaves and a Bud, Rahi tells the story of Ramesh, a character played by the 
Bollywood star, Dev Anand. An overseer employed by tyrannical British colonial 
planters, Ramesh supervises fellow workers on a tea plantation in the northeastern 
Indian state of Assam.5 The film’s storyline traces Ramesh’s transformation from a 
brutal and whip wielding lackey of British imperialists, into the heroic leader of a 
workers revolt against cruel and exploitative overlords. Four years previously, in 
1949, Sovexportfilm had purchased its first Indian film, Dharti Ke Lal (Children of 
the Earth). In 1951, a second Indian movie, Chinnamul (The Uprooted) was screened 
in Soviet cinemas. Neither film proved especially popular with Soviet cinemagoers. In 
turning to Rahi, Koulebiakin hoped that its more colourful and dramatic plot would 
buck this regrettable trend and capture the imagination of his fellow countrymen.6 
In August, India’s film censors passed the original cut of Rahi, which had been 
produced in Hindi for a domestic audience, without any cuts. An English language 
version of the film was subsequently examined by a special film committee, convened 
by the chairman of India’s central board of censors, Clifford Aggarwala, ‘who wanted 
to make sure about the film’s suitability for being sent abroad.’ After reviewing the 
film for a second time, the censors duly passed Rahi as suitable for export from India. 
Aggarwala went on to include Rahi in a list of films recommended to Koulebiakin by 
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the Indian board of censors as appropriate for audiences in Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics.7 Anxious to secure the Indian government’s blessing for Sovexportfilm’s 
purchase of Rahi, along with ten other Indian films, including Awara, Koulebiakin 
sought formal approval for the commercial transaction from India’s ministries of 
External Affairs (MEA), Information and Broadcasting, and Commerce. 
To Koulebiakin’s consternation, a succession of letters dispatched from 
Sovexportfilm to Indian government officials went unanswered. In an effort to cut 
through Indian bureaucratic red tape, a perplexed Koulebiakin turned to Abbas for 
assistance. The Indian film producer proved only too willing to help. In August 1947, 
following the end of British colonial rule in South Asia and the traumatic partition of 
the subcontinent into the sovereign states of India and Pakistan, India’s thriving 
cinematic industry was bifurcated. Caught up in the atmosphere of rancour, animosity 
and conflict that blighted Indo-Pakistani relations after 1947, films produced in India 
were boycotted in Pakistan. Denied access to familiar and profitable markets, Indian 
producers, such as Abbas, had begun to look beyond the subcontinent in search of 
new outlets for their movies. The Soviet Union, with an enormous network of state-
run cinemas, appealed to many Indian filmmakers as one solution to an unwelcome 
and pressing commercial and problem.  
In September 1953, at Koulebiakin’s request, Abbas undertook a ‘pilgrimage’ from 
Mumbai to India’s capital, New Delhi, to lobby Indian ministers on behalf of 
Sovexportfilm. Associated with a prominent circle of radical social writers in British 
India, Abbas had helped to launch the Indian People’s Theatre Association, which 
staged political plays throughout the 1940s. Born into a prosperous family with strong 
connections to the Indian nationalist movement, Abbas benefited from an education in 
English and Law at the prestigious Aligarh Muslim University. Following a stint in 
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journalism, where he cemented connections with prominent Indian politicians, Abbas 
had gravitated towards a career in scriptwriting and film production. On his arrival in 
New Delhi, Abbas raised Koulebiakin’s case in a series meetings held with C. B. Rao, 
B. V. Keskar, India’s Information Minister, and the nation’s prime minister, 
Jawaharlal Nehru. To his satisfaction, Abbas received assurances from government 
officials that no obstacles existed, in principle, to Indian films being exported to the 
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Legally, the Indian producer was informed, any 
film certified by India’s central board of censors could be sent abroad for screening. 
Since Rahi had successfully passed the board of censors, Abbas returned to Mumbai 
content that all was well and, ‘that seemed to be the “happy end” of the matter.’8 
In Early November, following up on the breakthrough that Abbas’ intervention 
appeared to have secured, Koulebiakin travelled to Delhi and handed government 
officials the list of eleven Indian films that Sovexportfilm had selected for exhibition 
in the Soviet Union. During a round of meetings with Rao, S. Bhoothalingam of the 
ministry of Commerce & Industry, R. T Chary of the MEA, and K. Subrahmanian, 
vice-chairman of the Film Federation of India, Koulebiakin discussed plans to stage 
an Indian film festival in Moscow, and expand the commercial distribution of Indian 
films in the USSR. Strictly speaking, as Abbas had discovered, Sovexportfilm did not 
require the Indian government’s permission to purchase export licences for Indian 
films. Nevertheless, in an effort to avoid unduly antagonising his hosts, Koulebiakin 
deemed it wise to procure some form of official endorsement. On 27 November, 
having returned to Mumbai, the Soviet official fired off a letter to the Information and 
Broadcasting ministry. This confirmed that having purchased distribution rights to 
eleven Indian films, Sovexportfilm had sent sample prints back to the USSR in 
preparation for the proposed festival of Indian films in the Soviet capital.  
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As Koulebiakin later noted, his letter of 27 November was motivated primarily by a 
desire to uphold diplomatic courtesy, and not by any sense of statuary obligation. 
‘Since we had already received your [the government of India’s] permission to export 
any Indian film,’ Koulebiakin informed the I&B ministry, ‘We wanted to inform you 
of our move of despatching of the films only because it is a custom among friendly 
countries to do so.’9 A month later, on 22 December, D. Krishna Ayyar, deputy 
secretary at the ministry of Information and Broadcasting, informed Koulebiakin that 
the Indian government had no objection to the export of ten of the films purchased by 
Sovexportfilm. An opinion on the eleventh film, Rahi, Ayyar confirmed, would 
follow in due course.10 
Koulebiakin heard nothing more from the Indian government until the following 
April, when a letter arrived at Sovexportfilm’s office on Mumbai’s Cuffe Parade from 
the ministry of Information and Broadcasting. To Koulebiakin’s dismay, the 
perfunctory letter stated that the ministry considered Rahi to be unsuitable for 
exhibition in the Soviet Union. In the period between December 1953 and April 1954, 
Abbas had signed a contract with Sovexportfilm for the export Rahi, the original 
Hindi print of which had been despatched to a Moscow film studio to be redubbed 
into Russian. Moreover, Abbas had advised Indian journalists that Sovexportfilm had 
acquired the rights to Rahi and would shortly be the releasing picture in cinemas 
across the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. In March, the leading Indian national 
newspaper, the Hindustan Times, proclaimed loudly that ‘Rahi Goes to Russia,’ and 
advised its substantial readership that, having viewed Abbas’ film in Moscow, the 
Great Arts Council of the USSR had selected Rahi for the honour of general 
distribution in the Soviet Union.11  
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Reluctant at this late stage in proceedings to unwind the commercial and logistical 
arrangements that Sovexportfilm had put in place to prepare Rahi for its release in the 
Soviet Union, Koulebiakin rushed off an urgent letter to Ayyar. Koulebiakin offered 
to recut Rahi at the direction of the ministry of Information and Broadcasting, 
excising any content that the Indian government deemed unsuitable for foreign 
audiences. Two months passed before Koulebiakin’s note received an answer. On 21 
June, to Koulebiakin’s distress, he received terse missive from Ayyar that ignored 
Sovexportfilm’s proposal to recut Rahi, and merely reiterated the Indian 
government’s objection to the films distribution in the USSR.12 
Elsewhere in Mumbai, Khwaja Ahmad Abbas fulminated at the Indian governments 
decision to categorize his film as inappropriate for export. Mystified that the ministry 
of Information and Broadcasting should have singled out Rahi for censure after it had 
been passed by the central board of censors, a perplexed Abbas bemoaned that he had, 
‘not the remotest idea what objection the Ministry can have to RAHI being shown in 
the USSR.’ In fact, the Indian film producer suspected that two different facets of 
Rahi had adversely influenced the Indian government’s attitude toward the film. The 
first, and less consequential issue, revolved around the Rahi’s less than sympathetic 
portrayal of its British protagonists. Although Abbas vehemently denied that his film 
was in any way ‘anti-British’, he correctly deduced that New Delhi was uneasy at the 
diplomatic furore that could ensue were the Soviet authorities to play up the 
exploitative character of British colonialism portrayed in Rahi. The second, and more 
substantive obstacle, lay in the powerful and evocative images that Rahi conjured up 
of a feudal, backward and underdeveloped India. At a time when the Nehru 
government was in midst of independent India’s first Five-Year Plan, which had been 
widely touted as a model blueprint for post-colonial modernization and development, 
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Indian bureaucrats took a dim view of anything that cut across the grain of a 
progressive national narrative. Anticipating just such a problem, before passing Rahi, 
the central board of censors had advised Abbas that the title sequence to his film 
should make it abundantly clear to audiences that the story was set in pre-
independence India, under British colonial governance.  
To Abbas, the Indian government’s position in relation to Rahi appeared not only 
irrational, but also culturally suspect. Punishing filmmakers for daring to make 
movies with a strong social message would, Abbas bemoaned, ‘only penalize and 
perhaps pauperize a poor producer like me who has already suffered terrible losses for 
daring to make films that do not correspond to the prevailing craze for cheap song-
dance stuff.’ Nevertheless, prioritizing commercial considerations over artistic 
integrity, Abbas elected to follow Koulebiakin’s lead, and seek out a pragmatic 
accommodation with the Indian government. Offering to cut any segment of his film 
that the Information and Broadcasting ministry deemed ‘objectionable’, Abbas 
emphasized his willingness to fly to New Delhi and personally, ‘complete shot-by-
shot [the] script and you [the Ministry of information and Broadcasting] can mark out 
the portions that you want deleted.’13 
Meanwhile, stung by the Indian government’s peremptory dismissal of the olive 
branch that he had extended of behalf of Sovexportfilm, an exercised Koulebiakin 
changed tack and went on to the offensive. On 30 June, in a letter sent to the ministry 
of Information and Broadcasting, Koulebiakin bluntly stated that he ‘could not help 
being surprised to see the lack of good will’ evidenced by the Indian government 
toward Sovexportfilm, which, he added pointedly, ‘cannot but produce undesirable 
[an] impression on our Principals in Moscow.’ The Soviet Union had, Koulebiakin 
underlined, believed that Sovexportfilm’s mandate to promote cinematic exchange 
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between India and the USSR was, ‘in accord with Indian commercial, cultural and 
political interests.’ Instead, the aloof and unresponsive manner in which Indian 
government officials had conducted relations with Sovexportfilm led Koulebiakin to 
surmise that: 
 
All matters with regard to the film “RAHI” look like artificial hindrance in the way 
of development of regular distribution of Indian films in the biggest film market of 
the world, that is in the U.S.S.R., and we cannot believe that such artificial and 
undesirable hindrance is in accord with the interests of India and Indian film 
industry.14 
 
 
Having put forward a ‘very reasonable solution’ to the Rahi impasse, and one that 
from Koulebiakin’s perspective both took into account the Indian government’s 
interests and avoided undue damage to Sovexportfilm’s prestige and financial 
position, the Soviet official expressed bewilderment at the ‘cold reception’ that it had 
garnered in New Delhi. In Koulebiakin’s view, the Indian government was guilty of 
making an unnecessary and, ‘too late move against “RAHI.”’ As such, the ministry of 
Information and Broadcasting was implored by the head of Sovexportfilm to think 
again, and ‘show your good will in this undesirably complicated question which will 
encourage us greatly to continue selection and distribution of Indian films in the 
U.S.S.R.’15 
The strained relationship between Sovexportfilm and India’s ministry of Information 
of Broadcasting played out against the wider background of an expanding Soviet 
cultural and political offensive in India. Following India’s independence, New Delhi’s 
relationship with the Soviet Union had been inhibited by Joseph Stalin’s conviction 
that nascent post-colonial states were little more than imperialist puppets. One Indian 
official recorded that the state-controlled Soviet press seemed determined to portray 
India as, ‘a stronghold of reaction, a persecutor of democratic forces, a hanger-on of 
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the Anglo-American bloc, and the harbinger of a new Imperialism in the East.’16 In 
June 1948, writing to his sister and India’s Ambassador to Moscow, Vijaya Lakshmi 
Pandit, Jawaharlal Nehru expressed deep concern about the official Russian attitude 
towards India. ‘Our attempts to increase friendly intercourse between India and the 
USSR have not met with any response in Russia,’ Nehru observed despondently. ‘The 
Soviet Government treats us with scant courtesy and even ignores us. Articles in their 
newspapers attack our Government,’ India’s leader complained. ‘I do not see why we 
should take these [Soviet] attacks lying down. Personally it seems to me exceedingly 
foolish of the Russian Government to follow this policy because this business of 
being tough does not win over any country’s sympathy for them.’17 
To the relief of Nehru’s government, signals had emerged from Moscow toward the 
end of the Stalin era of a softening in the Soviet approach to India. Having previously 
shunned social contact with Indian officials, during the course of 1953 the Soviet 
leadership began fraternizing with Indian diplomats. Andrey Vishinsky, foreign 
minister of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, started to attend receptions at the 
Indian Embassy in Moscow for the first time. In New Delhi, the Soviet ambassador 
displayed a new and ‘sudden affability’ towards his Indian hosts. At the same time, 
much of the ‘tendentious propaganda’ that the Soviet Union had directed at India 
ceased.18 More substantively, the Soviets began to take India’s side in its territorial 
dispute with Pakistan over the contested state of Kashmir. Aside from the strategic 
advantage that the Indian government identified in maintaining friendly relations with 
both the eastern and western Cold War blocs, many Indians, Nehru included, failed to 
share the visceral antipathy for communism prevalent in the United States and much 
of Western Europe. As an avowed socialist, the Indian premier acknowledged and 
admired Soviet accomplishments in fields as diverse as economic planning, education 
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and healthcare. Moreover, as one Indian official noted, Soviet calls for ‘the end of 
colonialism and racial discrimination and for redistribution of world wealth, are by no 
means disagreeable to India.’19 
In the cultural sphere, in the early 1950s concerned western diplomats in India began 
to record signs of, ‘increased attention being paid by the Soviet authorities to the 
improvement and widening of Indo-Soviet relations.’ In part, the Russian charm 
offensive in India was attributed to the arrival in New Delhi, in 1953, of a new Soviet 
ambassador, Mikhail Menshikov. The ‘social qualities’ exhibited by Menshikov, one 
British diplomat observed, appeared better suited to the promotion of Indo-Soviet ties 
than those of his dour predecessor, Kirill Novikov. This was not to say that Novikov 
had been entirely inactive in the cultural field. Early in 1951, the Soviet cine art 
festival, whose committee members included both the chief justice of Mumbai’s high 
court, and Jawaharlal Nehru’s youngest sister, Krishna Nehru Hutheesing, screened a 
programme of Soviet films in Delhi, Mumbai and Kolkata.20 In May that year, 
Archibald Nye, Britain’s high commissioner in India, cautioned Whitehall that a 
Soviet ‘cultural offensive’ in the India had seen, ‘an increase of activity by the Soviet 
Embassy in Delhi in the propaganda field and also in their contacts with Indians.’21 
Nye’s colleagues in the American embassy in New Delhi shared his anxiety. In June, 
American diplomats in the Indian capital informed Washington that, ‘It is quite 
apparent that the Communists are making a bid at the moment in the field of cultural 
infiltration; i.e., Soviet film festivals, GBS societies, influencing of IPTA theatre 
groups, work with art societies, and of course numerous journalistic sorties.’22 
Nonetheless, on his arrival in South Asia, Menshikov wasted little time in pushing 
for an increase in cultural exchange between India and the Soviet Union. On the new 
Ambassador’s watch, a branch of the Indo-Soviet cultural society was inaugurated in 
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New Delhi. Menshikov also arranged the staging of an Indian art exhibition in Russia, 
and for the celebrated Indian dancer, Indrani Rahman, to embark on a tour of the 
eastern bloc. In addition, Menshikov orchestrated the visit of a large Soviet cultural 
delegation to India. Headed by the Soviet deputy minister of culture, Nikolai H. 
Despalov, the delegation toured India between January and March 1954. The Soviet 
party, which included amongst its ranks acrobats, singers, instrumentalists, dancers 
and comedians, was compared by the British to a much bigger and more ambitious 
version of, ‘the kind of touring company that ENSA used to assemble during the war.’ 
In the Indian capital, the Soviet artistes entertained a crowd of 12,000 at a special 
open-air concert staged at the national stadium.23 Taken aback by the energy with 
which the Soviet ambassador had embraced the merits of cultural diplomacy, the 
British high commission in India grumbled to London that, ‘Mr. Menshikov has 
continued in his public statements to expound in a way that is now getting decidedly 
monotonous his two themes – trade and culture.’24 
It was not only the British, however, that evidenced reservations about the scale and 
purpose of the Soviet cultural offensive in India. Within the Indian press, 
Menshikov’s initiatives to promote Indo-Soviet amity began to come under ‘careful 
scrutiny.’ In April 1954, the Hindustan Times queried the ‘so-called good-will 
missions’ in which Indian delegations invited to the Soviet Union, ‘superficially 
compare the conditions in Russia with those in their own country.’ Such ‘missions’, 
the Hindustan Times noted, ‘never examine the background… of the regimented 
labour, the regimented Press and public opinion’ inside the Communist bloc.25 In 
conversation with British diplomats, while conceding his apprehension at the upsurge 
in Soviet cultural propaganda directed at India, the country’s home secretary, H.V.R. 
Iengar, quipped that it was fortunate most Indian film stars and artistes sent on 
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exchange trips to the USSR were, ‘incapable of understanding Communism.’26 
Iengar’s colleagues in India’s ministry of external affairs took a less relaxed 
approach to the issue of Soviet cultural diplomacy. For five years, between 1946 and 
1951, the Nehru government had been forced to battle an indigenous communist 
insurgency centered on the Telegana region of southern India.  Consequently, New 
Delhi took a firm line in its dealings with the Communist Party of India, arresting 
communist activists suspected of inciting civil disorder or engaging in political 
subversion. On the campaign trail during India’s first general election, which took 
place between October 1951 and February 1952, Nehru urged a crowd of Indian 
communists waving red banners etched with the Soviet hammer and sickle motif to 
‘go and live in the country whose flag you are carrying’.27 
Inside the MEA, misgivings mounted in the early 1950s over ‘evidence and reports’ 
that documented a, ‘considerable increase in the extent of systematic communist 
propaganda in India.’ In April 1952, writing to Vijaya Laskshmi Pandit in the Indian 
Embassy in Moscow, MEA officials complained that a ‘large number of [Soviet] 
propaganda films are imported [into India] every month.’ More pertinently, the MEA 
protested that:  
 
Several Indian films which convey a most degrading and undesirable impression of 
the country and its people have been imported into the Communist countries and 
adapted for local use and are being widely shown in communist countries. For 
example, “Uprooted” by Newail Ghosh, “Children of the Earth”, by Peoples 
Theatre and “Neecha Nigar”, agave a one-sided picture of Indian life, and yet the 
public in the U.S.S.R. and other places are being given this distorted view of 
India.28     
 
 
Attempts to impose some form of control the export of Indian films to communist 
countries through the central film censor board had, the MEA observed, met with 
protests from local embassies. While the Indian government had done its best to 
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accommodate requests from the eastern bloc for the export of films, the MEA noted 
that, ‘as far as Indian films are concerned only the undesirable ones are selected for 
exhibition to their [the Soviets] own people.’ This was all the more troubling to the 
MEA since Indian embassies in communist countries had no facilities to project an 
alternative image of India by, for example, arranging public screenings of films that 
portrayed a more positive and progressive impression of life in the subcontinent.29  
Against this background, Koulebiakin’s drive to export Indian films to the Soviet 
Union served as the catalyst for debate inside the Indian government, with Rahi at its 
epicentre, over how to respond to pressure emanating from Sovexportfilm to expand 
Indo-Soviet cinematic exchange. The deputy secretary of the MEA, R. T. Chari, 
advocated bypassing Koulebiakin and his agency, and taking Indian concerns over 
film exports directly to more senior officials in the Soviet government. In the pressing 
case of Rahi, however, Chari suggested adopting a pragmatic line. Not having seen 
the film, Chari noted the reservations expressed by the central board of censors and 
his colleagues within the Information and Broadcasting ministry in relation to its 
content. These encompassed the two sensitive political questions that had previously 
occupied Abbas. The first, surrounding ‘the susceptibilities of Englishmen since the 
story depicts the harsh treatment by English tea planters in Assam of Indian 
labourers,’ was not regarded as especially problematic by the MEA. The second issue 
remained one of adequate contextualisation. Although set in 1945, two years prior to 
India’s independence, Chari conceded that, ‘it would be unfortunate if audiences in 
the Soviet Union got the idea that these labour conditions [portrayed in Rahi] obtain 
even today in Assam.’30 
Reluctant to insist on cuts to the film, which Chari suspected would risk 
compromising its artistic integrity, the MEA official favoured approving the film’s 
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export to the USSR on the proviso that, ‘it was preceded by a statement that the film 
was made in 1945 and does not represent the actual position in India today.’ Chari’s 
colleagues at the ministry of Information and Broadcasting disagreed. Mr. Lad, the 
secretary of I&B, took exception to Chari’s proposal to sanction Rahi’s export under 
certain conditions, and continued to insist that ‘the film should not be shown abroad.’ 
Were Sovexportfilm to press ahead and exhibit Rahi in the USSR, Lad insisted, it 
should be made clear to Moscow that this had been done ‘against the advice of the 
Government of India.’31 
At this point in proceedings, an exasperated K. A. Abbas travelled once more from 
Mumbai to New Delhi, undertaking a second, and, on this occasion, decisive 
intervention in the Rahi story. Leveraging his personal connections within the upper 
echelons of Indian politics, on 10 July 1954, Abbas secured an interview with 
Jawaharlal Nehru. During his meeting with the Indian premier, Abbas took the 
opportunity to extoll the artistic merits of his film at some considerable length. At the 
same time, the Indian producer offered Nehru a less than flattering account of what he 
represented as a petty and internecine conflict over Rahi, that had broken out between 
squabbling bureaucrats in the MEA and I&B. By the end of his encounter with Nehru, 
Abbas had succeeded in obtaining the Indian premier’s blessing for Rahi to be 
exported to the Soviet Union. In a memorandum despatched to his ministers, Nehru 
confessed that, ‘I know nothing about this particular film [Rahi], but I have heard that 
it is considered as one of our best films of the year and might even get an award.’ ‘If 
it is a good film and it is made clear that it deals with our pre-Independence period,’ 
the Indian leader pronounced definitively, ‘there might perhaps, be no objection to its 
being sent to the USSR.’32 
	   18	  
Nehru’s intercession prompted a smug MEA to call upon the Information and 
Broadcasting ministry to ‘reconsider’ its position on Rahi.33 In response, B. V. 
Keskar, India’s minister for Information and Broadcasting, elected to beat a tactical 
retreat in relation to Abbas’ film, in the hope of securing a strategic victory on the 
broader question of film export controls. Keskar denied somewhat implausibly that 
there had ever been any question of his ministry discouraging Sovexportfilm from 
distributing films in the USSR that had been certified by the central board of censors, 
Rahi included. Rather, the minister claimed, his departments concern with the 
operations of Sovexportfilm had centred on matters of appropriate procedure. Above 
all, Keskar pointed to Koulebiakin’s presumption that, having selected a list of Indian 
films for export without first consulting officials at the I&B ministry, it would be a 
mere formality to obtain the Indian government’s post-facto approval. Such an 
approach was all the more problematic, he asserted, when, ‘in making the selection 
preference has been given [by Sovexportfilm] to films which show class conflict or 
economic trouble or revolt against colonialism…[and] is therefore tendentious and 
would not convey an adequate idea of Indian films.’ In the absence of adequate film 
export controls, Keskar argued, Indian movies risked, ‘being put to unscrupulous use 
in Russia.’ ‘It would not be desirable for foreigners to make a selection of Indian 
propaganda material from their point of view,’ the minister added, ‘and then expect 
the Government of India to accept that selection and officially approve it.’ In short, 
the ministry of Information and Broadcasting insisted that, ‘What must be made clear 
is that, if any film is to be shown abroad with the approval of the Government of 
India, the initial selection must be made by the Government of India.’34 
On the specific matter of Rahi, D. Krishna Ayyar was deputed to instruct 
Koulebiakin that there was now, ‘no question of this Ministry [I&B] interfering with 
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any business arrangements which you may have made in this [Rahi’s] behalf and I am 
to reiterate to you that you are at liberty to follow those business arrangements in any 
way you like.’35 Having finally given Sovexportfilm the green light to export Rahi to 
the Soviet Union, the Indian government made contact with the Soviet embassy in 
New Delhi. On 1 August, in a letter sent to Guerman I. Ashurov, the Soviet embassy’s 
counsellor, Chari underlined Indian reservations over Rahi’s suitability for export, 
and helpfully suggested how these might best be mitigated.  ‘To avoid the wrong 
impression that the scenes portrayed in this film in any way represent conditions 
prevailing in Assam tea plantations today,’ Ashurov was prodded to ensure that, ‘a 
suitable statement [is] projected on the screen in [Soviet cinemas] introducing the 
film.’36 
Having been dragged belatedly into the Rahi saga, Soviet diplomats in India 
immediately instructed Sovexportfilm to set about ameliorating the animosity that its 
actions had generated within Nehru’s government. On 5 September, in a grovelling 
letter sent to the ministry of Information and Broadcasting, the previously spikey and 
combative Koulebiakin expressed ‘sincere regret’ that, ‘measures taken by me in 
order to avoid any complications or misunderstanding [produced] quite [the] contrary 
impression.’ No doubt with his eye on the Indian film festival scheduled to take place 
in Moscow later that month, Koulebiakin begged forgiveness from the I&B ministry 
for his, ‘unexperience [sic] in local procedure as far as selection of films is 
concern[ed].’ Moving forward, the Soviet official pledged to work closely with the 
Indian government to facilitate the, ‘regular exchange of good films between India 
and USSR.’37 
On 23 September 1954, the Soviet minister of culture, Georgy Aleksandrov, 
formally opened the ‘Film Festival of the Republic of India’ in Moscow. Rahi 
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featured prominently amongst the exhibits. In his inauguration speech, Aleksandrov 
acclaimed the first Indian film festival to take place in the USSR as indicative of a 
‘new step’ in Indo-Soviet relations. ‘Expanding the exchange of films must play an 
important role in the growth and strengthening of cultural ties between our countries,’ 
the Soviet minister enthused. Listening appreciatively in the audience were K. A. 
Abbas, Dev Anand, Raj Kapoor, and a host of India’s most eminent film stars.38 Feted 
by his Soviet hosts, Abbas and his entourage were paraded before the Soviet public at 
special screenings held in Moscow’s Udarnik and Forum film theatres; were guided 
around the Kremlin, Palace of Culture, and Lenin mausoleum; and met with leading 
members of VOKS, the Soviet Society for Cultural Relations. The Indian visitors 
found their faces splashed across the front pages of Soviet newspapers.39 Some 800 
copies of Rahi were subsequently distributed inside the Soviet Union, where the film 
drew critical plaudits and played to packed houses. Reviewing Rahi in Sovetskaya 
Kirghizia, one Soviet film critic praised the film as a new milestone in ‘progressive’ 
cinematography. ‘Whereas in the previous Indian films we have seen social problems 
presented as an undercurrent, between the lines, as it were,’ Soviet citizens were 
informed, ‘here [in Rahi] they ring out with full power.’40  
The appeal of Indian films behind the Iron Curtain was brought home to Indian 
government officials the following year, when Jawaharlal Nehru paid a state visit to 
the Soviet Union. Nehru’s delegation included both Rahi’s leading man, Dev Anand, 
and Raj Kapoor, star of the hit film, Awara. As the official Indian party travelled 
across the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, its members were struck by an 
apparently genuine public affinity for Indian cinema. One Indian diplomat recorded 
that: 
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We saw a number of Indian pictures being shown (I was told to packed houses) not 
only in Central Asia, but as far north as Magnitogorsk. At one town...I entered my 
room in the villa placed at our disposal, I heard a catchy tune with a lilt being 
played on the gramophone. Experience at another town had taught me that the 
piece came from the film “Awara”.41 
 
 
Soviet authorities carefully stage-managed the Indian delegation’s programme. Yet, 
the fact that Awara is estimated to have attracted cinema audiences in the Soviet 
Union of some sixty million, suggests that Indian cinema did resonate particularly 
deeply with the country’s citizens.42 In part, this can be attributed to the socialist 
sentiments running through many Indian films, Rahi included. Equally, the vibrancy, 
colour, exuberance, and infuriatingly catchy songs that came to typify Indian 
cinematic output, offered a striking counterpoint to the duller and more mundane 
everyday realities of life inside the eastern bloc.  
Significantly, the modus operandi that Sovexportfilm established with the Indian 
government as a consequence of the Rahi affair, served as a model for Indo-Soviet 
cinematic exchange throughout the remainder of the Cold War. Periodic disputes 
continued to surface between different ministries inside the Indian government over 
the suitability of particular films for export to the Soviet Union.43 On occasions, 
Koulebiakin and his successors clashed with the ministry of Information and 
Broadcasting over the quantity, quality, and content of Indian films released to Soviet 
audiences. In March 1955, Koulebiakin was to be found bemoaning the absence of 
films from Bengal and south India on approved lists that the I&B ministry had, in 
collaboration with the Film Association of India, begun to issue to Sovexportfilm. 
‘Naturally you cannot expect that all of the films so far recommended by you will be 
liked by us,’ Koulebiakin grumbled in a letter to the under secretary of I&B. ‘We 
cannot understand why we should be deprived of the possibility to buy more films 
from India.’44  
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Generally, however, whilst chaffing at the constraints that its informal 
understanding with the Indian government imposed on Sovexportfilm’s freedom of 
action in the Indian film market, Moscow proved willing to operate within a set of 
political and cultural parameters imposed by New Delhi. Likewise, while keeping 
Indian film exports on a tight leash, the Indian government and, more specifically, the 
ministry of Information and Broadcasting, evidenced a more accommodating line 
with Sovexportfilm in the aftermath of the Rahi affair. In the cinematic realm, at least, 
whenever wider political considerations permitted, the Indian government invariably 
did what it could to keep the Soviets happy. 45  
Contemporary events have underlined the extent to which cinematic exchange came 
to represent a significant and enduring element of Indo-Soviet cultural politics during, 
and beyond, the Cold War. As late as 1984, the Indian film, Disco Dancer, a South 
Asian version of Saturday Night Fever, with the Bollywood star Mithun Chakraborty 
reprising the role that catapulted John Travolta to global fame, was pulling in huge 
audiences in Soviet cinemas.46 On his visit to India, in December 2010, the itinerary 
of Russian president, Dmitry Medvedev, included a tour of Mumba’s Yash Raj film 
studios. ‘Our country is one of the places where Indian culture is most admired,’ 
Medvedev pronounced during a joint news conference with India’s prime minister, 
Manmohan Singh. ‘Russia and India are the only countries where satellite channels 
broadcast Indian movies 24/7.’ Much as it had in the past, however, Medvedev’s 
foray into Indian cinema was driven principally by political and economic self-
interest. At the time, Moscow and New Delhi were considering a project to remake 
popular Indian films from the 1950s with joint casts of Indian and Russians actors. 
The two governments were also in the midst of negotiations involving the exchange 
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of fighter aircraft and nuclear technology. In the context of Indo-Russian relations, it 
seems, cinema’s attraction as an instrument of cultural diplomacy remains undimmed. 
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